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I. Introduction
This article discusses the appropriate standard of review a federal
habeas court should use to review a state court determination of federal
law unaccompanied by a rationale.  In other words, what standard of
review does the federal court employ when the state court’s opinion is
wholly composed of the phrases: “The claims are without merit.
Denied.”?  The Supreme Court has not explicitly resolved the issue, and
various federal judges around the country have reached different
opinions.  This paper will demonstrate that a close scrutiny of the
controlling habeas corpus statute, relevant case law, and policy
considerations leads to the conclusion that such a state court
determination is an adjudication entitled to statutory deference by federal
courts.
                                                                                                           
*  Associate, Gardere, Wynne, & Sewell, L.L.P., Houston, Texas; J.D. cum laude 2000, Duke
University School of Law; B.A. in Biology cum laude 1996, Rice University.
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II. Background
A. The Great Writ
The Constitution of the United States ensures the existence of the
writ of habeas corpus.1  Long ago, Congress empowered the federal
courts “to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may
be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of
any treaty or law of the United States.”2  Originally viewed as one of the
most important individual rights and a necessary check on executive
power,3 today the Great Writ has been roundly criticized as an
infringement on state sovereignty and a barrier to effective punishment.4
No doubt the critics are in some sense correct.
The writ of habeas corpus permits federal courts to order new
trials for state convicts whose detentions violate federal law.  In part, this
purpose derives sanction from Article III of the Constitution, which
proclaims that the federal courts are the ultimate arbiters of federal law.5
                                                                                                           
1  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
2  Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385; accord Ex parte  McCardle, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) (proclaiming the writ a judicial remedy for “every possible case of
privation of liberty contrary to the Constitution, treaties, or laws”).
3  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 499 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961)
(explaining that the Constitution provided for habeas corpus as protection against “arbitrary methods
of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary punishment upon arbitrary convictions”); Ex parte
Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that the writ served “to liberate
an individual from unlawful imprisonment”); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 867 (7th Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (“The writ known in 1789 was the pre-trial contest to the executives power to hold a person
captive, the device that prevents arbitrary detention without trial.”), rev’d on other grounds, 521
U.S. 320 (1997); see also Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330 (1915) (explaining that in 1867
Congress extended the privilege of the writ to “all cases of persons restrained of their liberty in
violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty of the United States”).  The idea reaches far back into
English jurisprudence.  See DANIEL J. MEADOR, HABEAS CORPUS AND MAGNA CARTA – DUALISM
OF POWER AND LIBERTY 25 (1966) (asserting that, by the mid-1600s, habeas corpus was “the mode
for vindicating the liberty of the subject by protecting him against confinement contrary to the due
process of law”) (emphasis in original); BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 131 (6th ed. 1774)
(describing the writ as “efficacious . . . in all manners of illegal confinement”).
4  See, e.g., S. CONF. REP. No. 3446 (Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Senator Hatch) (“I believe
convicted killers should be punished, and the particularly heinous killings ought to be punished with
the death penalty.  I think the survivors and family, the victims of this type of heinous murder, have
a right to see that those who killed their loved ones are justly punished.  That is why we have to pass
this provision.  It is long overdue.”); H.R. CONF. REP. H1426 (1996) (statement of Representative
Cox) (“But if habeas corpus, statutory habeas corpus is available simply to throw our the whole State
judicial system, why do we have it in the first place?  If we are going to look at all of these questions
from scratch, de novo, facts, evidence, law, the whole thing, as if the State proceeding had never
happened, then Robert Alton Harris would be able to, in the future, to be able to delay his execution
for 13 more years.”).
5 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 378-79 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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When applied to habeas review, this principle collides with state
sovereignty.6  After all, state courts are obligated to enforce federal law
to the same extent as federal courts, and principles of comity and
federalism dictate that their determinations be entitled to some deference.7
On a practical level, habeas corpus “entails significant costs” to state
criminal justice systems.8  The years of affirmations in state courts,
culminating in the issuance of a federal writ of habeas corpus ordering a
new trial, can render the prosecution’s case on retrial stale and
ineffective.  The state is forced either to release the accused or to attempt
to reconvict on often now-flimsy evidence.  If the state does retry, the
criminal process begins anew for the accused, who, if convicted again,
will likely take full advantage of all the state appellate and post-conviction
processes, as well as another round of federal habeas corpus.  There is no
question that habeas corpus intrudes upon the states’ implementation of
criminal justice and the “finality” of state convictions.9  Despite the
Supreme Court’s reiteration that habeas corpus remains an important and
widely accepted method for the vindication of fundamental constitutional
rights,10 a growing national disenchantment with current habeas corpus
litigation has led Congress to strive to alleviate its burdens.11
                                                                                                           
(“When federal judges exercise their federal-question jurisdiction under the ‘judicial power’ of
Article III of the Constitution, it is ‘emphatically the province and duty’ of those judges to ‘say what
the law is.’  At the core of this power is the federal courts’ independent responsibility—independent
from its coequal branches in the Federal Government and from the separate authority of the several
states—to interpret federal law.”) (citation omitted); id. at 402 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“‘We have
always held that federal courts, even on habeas, have an independent obligation to say what the law
is.’”) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 305 (1992) (O’Connor, J.)); Cooper v. Aaron, 358
U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[It is a] basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of
the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected . . . as a permanent and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
177-78 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.”).
6  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 379 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A construction of AEDPA that
would require the federal courts to cede this authority to the courts of the States would be inconsistent
with the practice that federal judges have traditionally followed in discharging their duties under
Article III of the Constitution.”).
7  See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404
(1959) (stating that state courts are obligated “‘equally with the courts of the Union . . . to guard,
enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States’”)
(quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
8  Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982).
9  See Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 210 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“It disturbs
the State’s significant interest in repose for concluded litigation, denies society the right to punish
some admitted offenders, and intrudes on state sovereignty to a degree matched by few exercises of
federal judicial authority.”).
10  See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000) (“The writ of habeas corpus plays a vital
role in protecting constitutional rights.”).
11  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404 (“Congress wished to curb delays, to prevent retrials on
federal habeas, and to give effect to state convictions to the extent possible under law.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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B. The Statute and the Supreme Court
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA),12 which substantially
changed federal habeas corpus jurisprudence.13  Prior to AEDPA, federal
courts entertaining a habeas petition reviewed state court determinations
of federal law de novo.14  AEDPA, however, amended habeas law to
direct federal courts to accord extreme deference to state court
determinations of federal law.15
AEDPA states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus . . . shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim –
(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was
based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.16
The Supreme Court recently interpreted this language in Williams
v. Taylor.17  The Court began by asserting that the phrases “contrary to”
and “unreasonable application of” have independent meaning.18  Tackling
                                                                                                           
12  Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended  at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-66
(1996)).
13  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 404 (“It cannot be disputed that Congress viewed §!2254(d)(1) as
an important means by which its goals for habeas reform would be achieved.”); id. at 412
(“[AEDPA] places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner’s
application .!.!.!.”).
14  See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 232 (1994) (“The preclusive effect of the jury’s
verdict, however, is a question of federal law which we must review de novo.”); O’Brien v. Dubois,
145 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (“Prior to AEDPA’s passage, a federal court’s exercise of habeas
corpus jurisdiction did not require that it pay any special heed to the underlying state court
decision.”); Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1985) (asserting that questions of law are
subject to plenary and independent review).  But see Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 285-95 (1992)
(Thomas, J.) (intimating that the “independent review” by federal habeas courts may be deferential).
15  In addition, AEDPA also restricted prisoners’ ability to file successive habeas petitions and
imposed a one-year limitations period on the filing of habeas petitions.  See Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§
101-09 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2001)).
16  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2001).
17  529 U.S. 362 (2000).
18  See id. at 404-05.
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the former phrase first, the Court suggested that a state court decision
could be “contrary to” clearly established Supreme Court precedent in at
least two ways: by identifying a rule that contradicts Supreme Court law19
or by confronting identical facts as a prior Supreme Court case and
reaching a different decision.20  The Court made clear that the “contrary
to” phrase does not permit review of the “manner in which [the state
court] applies Supreme Court precedent.”21
Review of the state court’s application and reasoning is instead
left to the “unreasonable application of” phrase.  If the state court
correctly identifies the salient Supreme Court rule but nevertheless
applies it unreasonably, habeas relief can be granted under the
“unreasonable application of” phrase of AEDPA.22  The Court made no
attempt to provide guidance to this admittedly tautological definition.23
Instead, the Court merely clarified that an unreasonable application is
different from an incorrect application.24  The Court expressly reserved
decision on whether AEDPA permits habeas relief for a state court’s
“unreasonable extension of” or “unreasonable failure to extend” Supreme
Court precedent.25
C. The Question
The question begged by Williams is whether a state-court
decision, purporting to dispose of a federal challenge on the merits but
failing to articulate any semblance of reasoning or controlling federal
authority, is an “adjudication” falling under the AEDPA § 2254
deferential standard of review.  The question has raised controversy in
the lower courts.26
                                                                                                           
19  See id. at 405 (“A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to our clearly established
precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our
cases!.!.!.!.”).
20  See id. at 406 (“A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court’s clearly
established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable
from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent.”).
21  Id. at 407.
22  Id. at 407-08 (stating that the “unreasonable application of” phrase encompasses a “state-
court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts
of a particular prisoner’s case”).
23  See id.  at 410 (“The term ‘unreasonable’ is no doubt difficult to define.  That said, it is a
common term in the legal world and, accordingly, federal judges are familiar with its meaning.”).
24 See id. at 410 (“For purposes of today’s opinion, the most important point is that an
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”)
(emphasis in original).
25  See id. at 408-09 (“Today’s case does not require us to decide how such ‘extension of legal
principle’ cases should be treated under § 2254(d)(1).”).
26 Compare Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Washington I )
(holding that a state court decision on the merits unaccompanied by a federal rationale is not an
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On the one hand, because AEDPA uses the terms “adjudication,”
“decision,” and “judgment,” the statute could be read as attributing
different meaning to each term—namely, reading “adjudicated” as
something more than mere “decision” or “judgment.”27  Also, the
determination of whether the “contrary to” or “unreasonable application
of” phrase applies to a particular state court decision cannot be made
without the appearance of the state court’s reference to federal law,28 and
further, two of the three AEDPA inquiries mandated by Williams cannot
readily be undertaken without some inkling of the state court’s rationale.29
                                                                                                           
“adjudication” entitled to AEDPA deference), superceded by Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45
(2d Cir. 2001) (hereinafter Washington II); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 184 (4th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (Motz, J., dissenting) (“State courts should not be allowed to insulate their decisions by failing
to express their reasoning.”), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 74 (2001); Royal v. Netherland, 4 F. Supp. 2d
540, 556-57 (E.D. Va. 1998) (arguably performing a de novo review but at the very least indicating
that “the deferential standard mandated by § 2254(d)(1) has less meaning in this situation”), aff’d sub
nom. Royal v. Taylor,  188 F.3d 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1000 (1999); Lockhart v.
Maddock, No. C97-1447 MJJ, 1999 WL 179688, at *8 (N.D. Cal. March 29, 1999) (applying de
novo review), rev’d sub nom. Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 2001); and Maxwell v.
Gilmore, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1088-89 (N.D. Ill. 1999), with Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190,
193-94 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]f a state court denies a prisoner’s claim without reasoning of any sort, our
authority under AEDPA is still limited to determining the reasonableness of the ultimate decision.”);
Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that perfunctory decisions on the
merits are “adjudications” under AEDPA); Bell, 236 F.3d 149; Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,
982 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a de novo review standard); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 n.1
(6th Cir. 2000) (“Where a state court decides a constitutional issue by form order or without
extended discussion, a habeas court should then focus on the result of the state court’s decision,
applying the [AEDPA] standard articulated above.”); Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“Since we have an adjudication on the merits, we must consider what it means to defer to
a decision which does not articulate a reasoned application of federal law to determined facts.  We
conclude, for reasons that follow, that we owe deference to the state court’s result, even if its
reasoning is not expressly stated.”) (emphasis in original).
The First and Eighth Circuits have yet to resolve the issue.  See Gary v. Dormire, 256
F.3d 753, 756 n.1 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the issue but declining to resolve it); Hurtado v.
Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 18 n.18 (1st Cir.) (recognizing the issue but declining to resolve it), cert.
denied, 122 S. Ct. 282 (2001).  The First Circuit did, however, indicate that when the state court
articulates a reasoning, the flaws of the reasoning may be indications of an unreasonable application.
Hurtado, 245 F.3d at 18, 19.  The Eleventh Circuit has not yet addressed the issue.
27  See Washington II, 255 F.3d at 54 (“This approach points out that the challenge of defining
‘adjudicated on the merits’ is all the greater because the statute uses ‘judgment,’ ‘decision,’ and
‘adjudication’ . . . without specifying the meaning of—and differences among, if any—these terms.”);
Washington I, 240 F.3d at 108 (“The statute does draw a distinction between a ‘judgment,’ a
‘decision’ and an ‘adjudication’ . . . .”).
28  See Washington II , 255 F.3d at 53-54 (“This approach looks to the view of at least six
justices in Williams v. Taylor that the substance of the state court decision should be examined in
order to determine which clause of § 2254(e) to apply and whether the state court decision was
‘contrary to’ or involved an ‘unreasonable application of’ federal law.”); Washington I, 240 F.3d at
108 (“Williams teaches that the substance of the state court decision must be examined in order to
determine which clause of §!2254(d)(1) should be applied.”).
29  See Washington II , 255 F.3d at 54 (“That analysis, the argument proceeds, cannot be
performed if the state court decision does not identify in some fashion the legal rule through which
the result was reached.”); Washington I, 240 F.3d at 108 (“Neither one of these inquiries can be
performed if the state court’s decision did not make any reference to a federal constitutional claim
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In addition, certain congressional statements arguably reveal an intent to
give deferential review only to the “reasoned decisions” of state courts.30
Finally, certain beneficial results might accrue to both state and federal
courts alike should the federal courts not defer to perfunctory state court
decisions.  For example, requiring state courts to delineate at least
skeletal reasons would help resolve the sometimes difficult question of
whether the state-court decision was on the merits or on procedural
grounds.31  Judge Calabresi has elegantly proposed that a state court could
choose to allow the federal courts to defer to an easy decision by
explaining its reasoning or to permit the federal courts to review de novo
a complex issue of constitutional law by refraining from writing a
difficult opinion.32
On the other hand, the language of AEDPA could be read as
instructing federal courts to review the state-court “decision,” not the
reasoning process,33 and as equating “adjudicated” with “decided by a
judicial officer on the merits and reduced to judgment accordingly.”34
Supporting this view is Congress’s desire to reduce federal supervision of
state courts.35  It also comports with general principles of federalism and
the Supreme Court’s caution that federal courts should avoid “impos[ing]
on state courts the responsibility for using particular language in every
case in which a state prisoner presents a federal claim.”36  As explained
below, this latter answer is correct, though not for all of the same
reasons.
                                                                                                           
by, for example, citing Supreme Court case law or state court precedents which themselves apply
federal law.”).
30  See Washington I , 240 F.3d at 109 (“This conclusion is in keeping with Congress’s
determination in enacting AEDPA that when state courts adequately satisfy their obligation to enforce
federal constitutional rights in criminal proceedings, their reasoned decisions adjudicating federal
claims require deference.  Such deference is due when state courts, for example, discuss or at least
cite Supreme Court case law or state court decisions which refer to federal law.”) (citation omitted).
31 See Washington II , 255 F.3d at 54 (“On this view, when the state court decision provides
some sense of its reasoning, it promotes an overall more efficient use of judicial resources and a
speedier and more accurate resolution of habeas petitions.  Thus, according to this approach, it could
obviate the need for the sometimes complicated analysis that arises when a federal habeas court
cannot determine whether a state court decided a claim on substantive or procedural grounds.”).
32 See id. at 63 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
33 See id. at 53 (“On one view, AEDPA directs federal habeas courts to ascertain whether a
state court adjudication has ‘resulted in a decision’ that is contrary to, or involves an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts.  That is, federal habeas courts are to evaluate the state court result, and not the reasoning
process.”) (internal citations omitted); Aycox v. Lyttle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“Section 2254(d) requires us to examine the ‘decision’ of the state court . . . . The focus is on the
state court’s decision or resolution of the case.”) (emphasis in original).
34  Washington II, 255 F.3d at 53.
35  See id. (“This approach . . . asserts that with AEDPA, Congress sought to reduce federal
court supervision of the state’s criminal processes and increase deference to state judicial
decisions.”).
36  Id. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772, 739 (1991)).
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III. Discussion
A. The Statute
AEDPA states quite clearly that an application for a writ of
habeas corpus “shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings”37 unless deferential
review warrants the issuance of a writ.  The clause “that was
adjudicated” thus mandates deference when the state court “adjudicated”
the claim “on the merits.”  The statute makes no mention of what,
exactly, an “adjudication” encompasses.  In legal contexts,
“adjudication” can mean both the process of a court’s reasoning and the
actual judgment.38  In AEDPA, the first definition is more appropriate.
Within the statutory context, “decision” clearly means the state
court “result:” no writ shall be granted unless the state adjudication
“resulted in a decision.”39  The accepted legal definition of “decision”
supports this usage.40  Thus, “decision” here has an air of finality akin to
“disposition” or “conclusion” and unlike “consideration” or “reasoning.”
By contrast, AEDPA uses “adjudication” much differently.  The language
refers to situations when “the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a
decision.”41  The “adjudication” necessarily precedes and causes the
“decision.”  The construction therefore reads coherently only if the
“adjudication” means the process of reasoning by which the “decision” is
reached.
I therefore agree with those who suggest that an “adjudication”
means something different than a mere “decision” or “judgment” and
necessarily contemplates some sort of judicial reasoning process.  That
interpretation, however, does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that a
decision unaccompanied by a written rationale actually was not
adjudicated.  The real question, therefore, is whether the term
“adjudicated” requires some articulated reasoning, as some courts have
assumed.42  This assumption is a poor one for several reasons.
                                                                                                           
37  28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2001).
38  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 42 (7th ed. 1999) (“1. The legal process of resolving a
dispute; the process of judicially deciding a case.  2. JUDGMENT.”) (emphasis in original).
39  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2).
40  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 414 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “decision” as a “judicial
determination after consideration of the facts and the law; esp., a ruling, order, or judgment
pronounced by a court when considering or disposing of a case”) (emphasis omitted).
41  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
42  See Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) ( Washington I ) (“Such
deference is due when state courts, for example, discuss or at least cite Supreme Court case law or
state court decisions which refer to federal law.”), superceded by Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d
45 (2d Cir. 2001) (Washington II); cf. Washington II, 255 F.3d at 53 (“Another approach would find
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First, it is without justification in the statute.  The ordinary
meaning of the term “adjudicated” (i.e., as a “reasoning process”) is not
restricted to a written explanation.  An “adjudication” can be written,
oral, or purely cognitive.  These three facets of “adjudication” are as
intertwined with its meaning as the others.  To hold that AEDPA
somehow restricts the meaning of “adjudicated” to one particular method
of the decision-making process would require some textual indication that
Congress was so confining it.  Yet the statute makes no such intimation.
It does not condition deference on the articulation of reasoning.43  Nor
does it suggest that an unarticulated adjudication should not be presumed
to be an adjudication.  In fact, AEDPA gives no indication that the
differences between written and mental adjudications are at all important.
The language only refers to some state court adjudication on the merits.44
The text itself, therefore, speaks to what is required when an adjudication
on the merits has taken place, whether written or not.
The argument that an unarticulated adjudication cannot be
reviewed45 is irrelevant for the simple reason that AEDPA does not
contemplate federal review of state adjudications.  AEDPA directs federal
courts to look to state court decisions when conducting a review, not
adjudications.46  It is only when a decision is “contrary to, or involved an
                                                                                                           
that unexplained, summary dismissals of federal claims are not ‘adjudicat[ions] on the merits.’”)
(alteration in Washington II).
43  See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 311 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Nothing in the phrase
‘adjudicated on the merits’ requires the state court to have explained its reasoning process.  Nowhere
does the statute make reference to the state court’s process of reasoning.”); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d
149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“First and foremost, the language of § 2254(d) does not support
such a requirement.  Section 2254(d) requires federal habeas courts to ascertain whether the
underlying state court adjudication of a claim on the merits resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent.  It does
not require that a state court cite to federal law in order for a federal court to determine whether the
state court decision is an objectively reasonable one . . . .”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 74 (2001).
44  For that matter, the statute arguably does not specify what standard a federal court must use
when no adjudication was actually performed by the state court.  The clause “that was adjudicated” is
not a conditional clause; rather, it is an adjectival clause modifying the word “claim.”  Nothing in the
literal reading of the text indicates how to review the merits of a claim that was not adjudicated on the
merits in state court proceedings.
45  See, e.g., Washington I, 240 F.3d at 108-09 (discussing the futility of analyzing perfunctory
decisions).
46  See Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311-12 (“[ T]he federal court will focus its review on whether the
state court’s ultimate decision was an ‘unreasonable application’ of clearly established Supreme Court
precedent.”); Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 20 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The ultimate question on habeas,
however, is not how well reasoned the state court decision is, but whether the outcome is
reasonable.”); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (“Where a state court decides
a constitutional issue by form order or without extended discussion, a habeas court should then focus
on the result of the state court’s decision, applying the [AEDPA] standard . . . .”); Aycox v. Lytle,
196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e owe deference to the state court’s result, even if its
reasoning is not expressly stated. . . .  The focus [of AEDPA] is on the state court’s decision or
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unreasonable application of, clearly established law” or when a decision
“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” that habeas
relief can be granted.47  I discuss this argument in more detail below in
the context of Williams v. Taylor.  Suffice it to say at this point that,
whatever the dictates of the Supreme Court, the text of AEDPA instructs
federal courts to review decisions, not reasoning.
In addition, strong support exists for the interpretation that
“adjudicated on the merits” is an AEDPA term of art which emphasizes
“merits” rather than “adjudicated.”48  The term “adjudicated”
immediately precedes the term “on the merits,” and the conjoined phrase
appears in its own isolated dependent clause.49  The grammatical
juxtaposition of the terms “adjudicated” and “on the merits,” coupled
with their isolation in a dependent clause, suggests an intimate connection
between the terms and their meanings.  The most important part of the
                                                                                                           
resolution of the case.”) (emphases in original); cf. Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th
Cir. 1997) (Posner, C.J.) (“Another way to take ‘unreasonable’ in the new law, however, is as
having reference to the quality of the reasoning process articulated by the state court in arriving at the
determination.!.!.!.  But we do not think this approach is correct.”), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819
(1997).
47  28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(1), (2).  After all, as the Supreme Court has indicated, a habeas court
“does not review a judgment, but the lawfulness of the petitioner’s custody simpliciter.”  Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991) (emphasis in original).  Reviewing the judgment of the state
court is simply the judicially proper vehicle for reviewing the constitutionality of the detention.  See
id. (“Nevertheless, a state prisoner is in custody pursuant to a judgment.”) (emphasis in original).
48  See Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001) (“In the context of federal habeas
proceedings, adjudication ‘on the merits’ is a term of art that refers to whether a [state] court’s
disposition of the case was substantive as opposed to procedural.”); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274,
281 (5th Cir. 2000) (“In the context of federal habeas proceedings, a resolution (or adjudication) on
the merits is a term of art that refers to whether a court’s disposition of the case was substantive, as
opposed to procedural.”).
The Second Circuit has intimated that “adjudicated on the merits” is a term of art which,
whether used in the habeas corpus statute or in the law of res judicata, encompasses summary
dispositions on the merits.  See, e.g., Sellan, 261 F.3d at 311 (“When Congress uses a term of art
such as ‘adjudicated on the merits,’ we presume that it speaks consistently with the commonly
understood meaning of this term.  ‘Adjudicated on the merits’ has a well settled meaning: a decision
finally resolving the parties’ claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the
claim advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.”) (internal citation omitted);
Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2001) (Washington II ) (“Congress, on this view,
may also have had in mind the well-settled meaning of ‘adjudicated on the merits’ as used in the res
judicata context in civil litigation.  [Under res judicata,] even the most summary orders disposing of
federal claims without comment are adjudications on the merits . . . .”) (emphasis in original).
I believe this argument to be on shaky ground for three reasons.  First, Congress
specifically considered, and emphatically rejected, an amendment which would have given res
judicata effect to state court judgments on the merits.  See 141 CONG. REC. S7849 (June 7, 1995)
(defeating the Kyl Amendment).  Second, the Supreme Court has considered the phrase “adjudicated
on the merits” in the context of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and held that it
does not mean the same as it does in res judicata jurisprudence.  See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 121 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (2001).  Third, courts have considered, and uniformly
discarded, an interpretation of habeas corpus review that engenders state court decisions with res
judicata effect on federal courts.  See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 334 (1915).
Nevertheless, to the extent this res judicata argument is persuasive, it certainly furthers my own.
49  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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dependent clause “that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings” is arguably the phrase “on the merits.”  A constitutional
claim that was rejected by a state court pursuant to a state procedural bar,
as opposed to “on the merits,” cannot be reviewed by a federal court at
all, much less under a deferential standard of review.50  Because of this
distinction, it is likely that the phrase “adjudicated on the merits” accents
the “on the merits” portion.  This is not to say that the term
“adjudicated” is merely filler.  If the state court has wholly failed to
adjudicate a federal claim, on the merits or otherwise, § 2254 cannot
apply.51  However, beyond the bare requirement that the federal claim
actually be considered, the force of the phrase “adjudicated on the
merits” is that it be considered “on the merits.”52  In light of these
concerns, it is extremely unlikely that the term “adjudicated” has any
special limitation to “written reasoning.”
Second, the assumption contravenes the basic intricacies inherent
in a judicial system.  “Adjudicate” is what courts do, even when they fail
to delineate their reasoning on paper.  It is an inherent and paramount
assumption of the American judicial system that courts confronted with a
justiciable controversy faithfully adjudicate claims, which result in
decisions.53  To assume that a court has not faithfully adjudicated a
controversy simply because the resulting decision is unaccompanied by a
written summary of that adjudication is to turn to the judicial system on
                                                                                                           
50  See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 ; Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977).  If the state
procedural rule is constitutionally adequate, the petition is barred from asserting the defaulted claim
on habeas unless he can show cause for his default and prejudice therefrom.  See Edwards v.
Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
51  See Gary v. Dormire, 256 F.3d 753, 756 n.1 (8th Cir. 2001) (“If a claim was not presented
in State court, it cannot be said it was ‘adjudicated on’ under even the most liberal construction of §
2254(d).”); Miller, 200 F.3d at 281 n.4 (taking the view that a merits review of a petition which the
state court rejected on procedural grounds must be de novo) (citing Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409,
416 (5th Cir. 1997)); Lockhart v. Johnson, 104 F.3d 54, 57-58 (5th Cir. 1997) (“As stated above,
this claim was not presented to the state court, and the Director has waived the exhaustion
requirement.  Consequently, the AEDPA’s provision altering our standard of review, when the
petitioner’s claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a state court, has no application to this
claim.”); cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404 (2000) (“Section 2254(d)(1) defines two
categories of cases in which a state prisoner may obtain federal habeas relief with respect to a claim
adjudicated on the merits in state court.”).  The Seventh Circuit has held that a state court decision
which fails to reach the merits cannot be reviewed under § 2254(d) but must instead by reviewed
under § 2243, which requires a disposition “as law and justice require[s].”  See Braun v. Powell, 227
F.3d 908, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2000).  This is not an unreasonable position to take.  See Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992) (Thomas, J.).
52  Of course, a written delineation of the adjudication enables federal courts to decipher more
easily whether the state-court decision was on the merits or on procedural grounds.  However, this
benefit is mooted when the state court clearly disposes of the claims on their merits.
53  See, e.g. , Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 314 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The notion that state
courts may absolve themselves of their duty to decide federal questions has no basis in the law.
Under the Supremacy Clause, state courts are obligated to apply and adjudicate federal claims fairly
presented to them.”); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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its head.54  This assumption is especially important in the context of
habeas corpus, in which federal courts are reviewing the decisions of a
co-equal state judicial system.  Principles of comity and federalism dictate
that assumptions as to the propriety of state judicial systems be resolved
in a manner most favorable to the state courts.  At least two courts have
assumed that a summary denial on the merits was nevertheless
“adjudicated” by the state courts.55
Third, legitimate justifications for summary dispositions
undermine the assumption that they are not adjudications.  Many courts in
the United States—if not all—have, from time to time, issued perfunctory
decisions.56  Part of the reason concerns judicial economy.  Most courts,
state appellate courts included, are busy tribunals.57  Writing out in
opinion form a court’s meticulous review of constitutional law followed
by an exhaustive analysis of the facts surrounding a criminal trial and
conviction would be a tremendous waste of resources for appellate issues
that obviously lack merit.  It is enough that the judges’ collective wealth
of legal knowledge and intuition, confirmed by an appropriate review of
the law and facts, is codified in a simple, summary decision.  In short,
there is dubious basis for assuming that such a summary decision is the
product of a dereliction of judicial duty.
These reasons undermine the interpretation that a state court’s
perfunctory decision cannot be an “adjudication” within the literal
                                                                                                           
54  See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947) (“[ T]he obligation of states to enforce these
federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they
provide.”).  A contrary assumption implicitly calls into question the skill of state judges.  See Sellan,
261 F.3d at 312 (“[T]his would reflect doubt regarding the capabilities of the New York courts as
fair and competent forums for the adjudication of federal constitutional rights . . . .”); see also
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 240 n.2 (1985) (“It denigrates the judges who
serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land.”).
55  See, e.g., Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 158 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“However, we may
not presume that [the] summary order is indicative of a cursory or haphazard review of [the]
petitioner’s claims.  Rather, the state court decision is no less an ‘adjudication’ of the merits of the
claim and must be reviewed under the deferential provisions of § 2254(d)(1).”) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted) (alterations in Bell), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 74 (2001); Aycox v. Lytle,
196 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 1999) (“There is no evidence here that the state court did not
consider and reach the merits of Aycox’s claim.  Since we have an adjudication on the merits, we
must consider what it means to defer to a decision which does not articulate a reasoned application of
federal law to determined facts.”).
56  The Supreme Court of the United States on a daily basis denies or grants petitions for
certiorari without discussion.
57  Judge Calabresi acknowledged as much in his Washington II concurrence.  See Washington
v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (Washington II )
(“Specifically, if AEDPA deference were deemed automatically and universally to apply, then that
law would require extremely busy State court judges to figure out what can be very complicated
questions of federal law at the pain of having a defendant incorrectly stay in prison should the State
court decision of these complex questions turn out to be mistaken (but not unreasonably).”).
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meaning of AEDPA.  However, some courts claim to have found extra-
textual support in the Supreme Court’s decision Williams v. Taylor.58
B. Williams v. Taylor59
The argument has been made that because AEDPA deferential
review cannot be conducted in two of the three ways set forth by Williams
if the state court fails to articulate a federal basis for its rejection of the
petitioner’s constitutional claims, the Supreme Court implicitly imposed
an articulation requirement.60  The argument fails for several reasons.
There can be no dispute that at least one of the three inquiries set
forth by the Supreme Court can be conducted on a summary disposition.61
A state-court decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if
different than the result of a Supreme Court case with materially
indistinguishable facts.62  A state-court decision need not be accompanied
by an articulated rationale to be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent
under this inquiry.63  All that is necessary is a review of the facts and the
disposition.
The other two inquiries are, admittedly, more difficult without a
written reasoning.64  Williams instructed that a decision can be “contrary
                                                                                                           
58  See, e.g., id. at 53 (“This approach looks to the view of at least six justices in Williams v.
Taylor that the substance of the state court decision should be examined!.!.!.!.”); Hurtado v. Tucker,
245 F.3d 7, 18 (1st Cir. 2001) (relying in part on Williams to set forth guidelines for evaluating a
state court’s decision which include looking to the substance of the state court’s reasoning);
Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2001) (Washington I) (reasoning that the
Williams inquiries cannot be undertaken without some inkling of the state court’s federal rationale),
superceded by Washington II, 255 F.3d 45; Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 696 (5th Cir. 2001)
(“There is, therefore, at least some basis for the view that Section 2254(d)’s ‘unreasonable
application’ standard refers to the quality of the state court’s analysis.”).
59  529 U.S. 362 (2000).
60  See Washington II, 255 F.3d at 54 (“This approach to the statute infers from Williams that
Congress’s direction that § 2254(d) only applies to claims that were ‘adjudicated on the merits’ by the
state courts means that such ‘adjudication’ only takes place when the state court decision makes its
rationale (the legal rule it applied) at least minimally apparent.”); Washington I, 240 F.3d at 108-09.
61  Even Washington I  implicitly conceded this point.  The court discussed the inability to
undertake the “contrary to” Williams inquiry because no federal rationale was apparent from the
state-court opinion, but it did not comment on the ability to determine whether the state-court set of
facts was materially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case.  See Washington I, 240 F.3d at
108.
62  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 406.
63  Indeed, the Supreme Court acknowledged as much when it stated that the “contrary to”
phrase does not permit review of the “manner in which [the state court] applies Supreme Court
precedent.”  Id. at 407.
64  See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We recognize that a state
court’s explanation of the reasoning underlying its decision would ease our burden in applying the
‘unreasonable application’ or ‘contrary to’ tests.”); Aycox v. Lytle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1999) (“Of course, it is far preferable if the state court explains its reasoning because then we
are not forced to guess as to the reasoning behind a determination.  A state court’s explanation of it’s
reasoning would avoid the risk that we might misconstrue the basis for the determination, and
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to” clearly established federal law if based on a legal rule that contradicts
Supreme Court precedent.65  A decision made without reference to
specific federal law cannot, ipso facto, identify a legal rule which could
contradict Supreme Court caselaw.66  The Court also stated that habeas
relief can be granted if the state-court decision “involved an unreasonable
application of” Supreme Court precedent.67  Implicit in that directive is a
precondition that the state court at least “correctly identif[y] the
governing legal rule but appl[y] it unreasonably to the facts.”68  Without
those actions by the state court, a habeas court cannot conduct an
“unreasonable application of” inquiry.69  Under this view, it could be
concluded that a summary denial circumvents these two inquiries.
In fact, it is not precisely the case that these two inquiries cannot
be conducted on a disposition devoid of federal rationale.  If there is no
controlling federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court, for
example, habeas relief is unavailable.70  A determination on whether the
controlling federal law has been clearly established by the Supreme Court
is an easy undertaking independent of the state-court decision.  Thus, in
reviewing a state-court decision lacking reference to federal law, a habeas
court could, faithfully to the language of AEDPA, conclude that habeas
relief is not warranted under the “contrary to” phrase because no clearly
established Supreme Court precedent existed.
At least one circuit has held similarly.  In Harris v. Stovall,71 the
Sixth Circuit confronted a state-court summary denial.72  The court
determined that no Supreme Court precedent had been extended to apply
to the particular facts at hand.  Because no Supreme Court precedent
                                                                                                           
consequently diminish the risk that we might conclude the action unreasonable at law or under the
facts at hand.”).
65  See Williams, 529 U.S. at 405.
66  See Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2001) ( Washington II ) (“That
analysis, the argument proceeds, cannot be performed if the state court decision does not identify in
some fashion the legal rule through which the result was reached.”); Washington I, 240 F.3d at 108;
Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 871 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (reasoning that if there is no clearly
established federal law then the state court decision cannot fail the “contrary to” test), rev’d on other
grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
67  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
68  Williams, 529 U.S. at 407.
69  Cf. Washington I, 240 F.3d at 108 (“Neither one of these inquiries can be performed if the
state court’s decision did not make any reference to a federal constitutional claim by, for example,
citing Supreme Court case law or state court precedents which themselves apply federal law.”); Doan
v. Brigiano, 237 F.3d 722, 730 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Because the Ohio Court of Appeals did not even
identify in its opinion that Doan had a federal constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury that
considers in its deliberations only the evidence presented against him at trial, the ‘unreasonable
application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) does not govern our analysis.”); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976,
981-82 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the lack of state court rationale precluded an evaluation “under
the models suggested by Justice O’Connor in Williams”).
70  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
71  212 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2000).
72  See id. at 943.
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clearly controlled the outcome, the court concluded that it could not grant
the petition under the “contrary to” phrase.73
Likewise, a federal court can determine whether a perfunctory
disposition is an “unreasonable application of” Supreme Court precedent.
Even a summary decision can be patently unreasonable in light of
controlling Supreme Court precedent if no reasonable analysis could have
led to the decision reached by the state court.  In other words, a federal
court would ask the question: “Was the state court’s rejection of the
constitutional claims an objectively reasonable one in light of the facts of
the case and the controlling law of the Supreme Court?”74  In answering,
a habeas court would still be adhering to the language of the statute by
refusing to grant habeas relief unless the state-court decision must have
been the result of an unreasonable application.75  Several circuit courts
have actually undertaken this exact inquiry.76
Federal courts are not strangers to deferential review of
perfunctory decisions.  Take district-court review of a magistrate judge’s
non-dispositive discovery rulings, for example.  The magistrate judge’s
decisions are subject to district-court review under a “clearly erroneous
                                                                                                           
73  See id. at 945.
74  A few circuit courts have devised similar tests.  See Neal v. Puckett, 239 F.3d 683, 695
(5th Cir. 2001) (asking whether the state court’s determination is at least minimally consistent with
the facts and circumstances of the case); Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir.) (Posner,
C.J.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 819 (1997).
75  Granted, Williams itself looked to the state court reasoning to engage its “unreasonable
application of” analysis.  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).  But there, at least, the Court
had some reasoning to review.  I do not here give opinion on what role the state court’s opinion, if
given, should play in the inquiry.  I pose only the following hypothetical.  Say a state court identified
an erroneous Supreme Court precedent (overruled, for example), or completely misapplied the
correct legal precedent, but nevertheless came to exactly the correct disposition.  What would a
federal court do then?  Should the federal court grant the writ based on the state court’s legal error
even though no constitutional right was violated?  Or deny the writ based on the fact no constitutional
right was violated but in arguable contravention of Williams v. Taylor?
76  See, e.g. , Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 315-17 (2d Cir. 2001) (reviewing a summary
denial under the “unreasonable application of” phrase); Neal, 239 F.3d at 696-97 (reviewing a
poorly-reasoned state-court decision under the “unreasonable application of” phrase by “look[ing]
only to the substance of the . . . decision”); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 166 (4th Cir. 2000) (en
banc) (denying the writ because the summary state disposition was not an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 74 (2001); Bacon v. Lee, 225 F.3d 470, 482 (4th
Cir. 2000) (denying the writ because the summary state disposition was not an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent); Gordon v. Kelly, 205 F.3d 1340 (6th Cir. 2000) (denying
the writ because the state disposition was not unreasonable); Aycox v. Lyttle, 196 F.3d 1174, 1178-
80 (10th Cir. 1999) (denying the writ because the state disposition was not unreasonable); Hennon,
109 F.3d at 334-35 (denying the writ under the “unreasonable application of” prong without looking
to the state court’s perfunctory reasoning); see also, e.g., Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 97-98 (2d
Cir. 2001) (granting the writ because the state court’s summary decision was an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent); Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 205 (2d Cir. 2001)
(granting the writ because the state court’s summary decision was an unreasonable application of
Supreme Court precedent); Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2000) (granting the
writ because the state court’s summary decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent).
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or contrary to law” standard.77  Magistrate judges rarely reduce their
rulings to a written analysis, often preferring instead to rule by summary
oral order from the bench.  In deferentially reviewing such orders,
district judges are left with the factual record and the applicable law to
determine whether the magistrate judge clearly erred or acted contrary to
law.  This is not a particularly arduous task, and district courts review
magistrates in such a manner all the time.  Habeas review is not
appreciably different.
Federal courts can conduct full deferential habeas review of
perfunctory state-court decisions while remaining faithful to both the
language of AEDPA and the teaching of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Williams.  The next question is whether the legislative history evinces a
contrary intent.
C. Legislative Clues
The legislative history on this question is unilluminating.  While
Congress was clearly concerned with establishing a deferential review of
state-court decisions,78 there is no indication that any member considered
the question raised here.  Washington I did purport to buttress its
conclusion with legislative statements which, it claimed, were evidence of
Congress’s insistence that state courts produce reasoned and thoughtful
adjudications.79  Even were it true that the sections of the Congressional
Record cited in support by Washington I really did support that
proposition, no section even remotely suggests that Congress believed
state courts could only decide federal questions with due consideration
when they articulated their reasoning in a written opinion.  In short, the
legislative history is unhelpful to resolving the meaning of “adjudicated.”
                                                                                                           
77  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also  FED. R. C IV. P. 72(a) (“The district judge . . . shall
consider such objections and shall modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate judge’s order
found to be clearly erroneous or contrary to law.”).
78  See, e.g. , 142 CONG. R EC. S3446, 3447 (1996) (statement of Senator Hatch) (“[The
AEDPA] simply ends the improper review of State court decisions.  After all State courts are
required to uphold the Constitution and to faithfully apply Federal laws.  There is simply no reason
that Federal courts should have the ability to virtually retry cases that have been properly adjudicated
by our State courts.”); 142 CONG. REC. H2247, 2249 (1996) (statement of Representative Hyde)
(“[Deference] is given to State courts’ legal decisions if they are not contrary to established Supreme
Court precedent.  That is to avoid relitigating endlessly the same issues.  There is a system of State
courts.  We give them deference, provided their decisions are not contrary to Supreme Court
precedent.”).
79  See Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) ( Washington I ) (“This
conclusion is in keeping with Congress’s determination in enacting AEDPA that when state courts
adequately satisfy their obligation to enforce federal constitutional rights in criminal proceedings,
their reasoned decisions adjudicating federal claims require deference.!.!.!.  [S]uch deference is due
when state courts, for example, discuss or at least cite Supreme Court case law or state court
decisions which refer to federal law.”), superceded by Washington v. Schriver, 255 F.3d 45 (2d Cir.
2001) (Washington II).
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D. Policy Arguments
Several policy arguments support my interpretation of
“adjudication.”  First, it coincides with the principles of comity and
federalism that are central to habeas corpus.80  Federal courts rarely favor
the distasteful practice of instructing state courts to explain their
reasoning in greater detail.81  As the Supreme Court has reiterated in the
habeas corpus context, federal courts may not tell state courts how to
write opinions.82
                                                                                                           
80 See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 329 (1915) (directing courts to defer to state court
procedures for reasons of comity and federalism).  I do not suggest that my argument is supported by
the federalism and comity concerns espoused by Congress in debating on AEDPA.  I am aware that
Chief Judge Posner recently stated that review of state-court reasoning is “just the kind of tutelary
relation to the state courts that the [AEDPA] amendments are designed to end.”  Hennon, 109 F.3d
at 335.  While I agree that a “tutelary relationship” has no place in federal habeas corpus under the
statute and case law, I cannot agree that Congress enacted AEDPA with the design of removing any
such relationship.  Instead, the legislative history more convincingly suggests that Congress desired to
promote the finality of state convictions, rather than protect federalism.  See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP.
H1426 (Feb. 8, 1995) (statement of Representative Cox) (“But if habeas corpus, statutory habeas
corpus is available simply to throw out the whole State judicial system, why do we have it in the first
place?  If we are going to look at all of these questions from scratch, de novo, facts, evidence, law,
the whole thing, as if the State proceeding had never happened, then Robert Alton Harris would be
able to, in the future, to be able to delay his execution for 13 more years.”); S. CONF. REP. S3446
(Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Senator Hatch) (“I believe convicted killers should be punished, and
the particularly heinous killings ought to be punished with the death penalty.  I think the survivors
and family, the victims of this type of heinous murder, have a right to see that those who killed their
loved ones are justly punished.  That is why we have to pass this provision.  It is long overdue.”);
H.R. CONF. REP. H2249 (YEAR) (statement of Representative Hyde) (“Deference is given . . . to
avoid relitigating endlessly the same issues.”).
Of course, some voiced concerns of state comity.  See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. H1427
(Feb. 8, 1995) (letter from Attorneys General to Representative Hyde) (“As Attorneys General for
our respective states we are confronted with a system of federal habeas review that is often intrusive,
cumbersome, and time consuming. . . .  The central problem underlying federal habeas corpus
review is a lack of comity and respect for state judicial decisions.”); S. CONF. REP. S3446 (Apr. 17,
1996) (statement of Senator Hatch) (“Why then, given this preference for reasonableness in the law,
should we empower a Federal court to reverse a State court’s reasonable application of Federal law to
the facts?  Our proposed standard simply ends the improper review of State court decisions.  After
all, State courts are required to uphold the Constitution and to faithfully apply Federal laws.”); H.R.
CONF. REP. H2249 (YEAR) (statement of Representative Hyde) (“There is a system of State courts.
We give them deference, provided their decisions are not contrary to Supreme Court precedent.”).
But these concerns are a far cry from Chief Judge Posner’s statement.
81  See Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 2001) (“‘[ T]his would place us in the
position of dictating to state courts that they must issue opinions explicitly addressing the issues
presented or else face ‘second guessing’ by the federal courts.’”) (quoting Capellan v. Riley, 975
F.2d 67, 72 (2d Cir. 1992)).
82  See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 7 (1995) (reaffirming a federal presumption that state
court decisions are on the merits “to obviate the ‘unsatisfactory and intrusive practice of requiring
state courts to clarify their decisions to the satisfaction of this Court’”) (quoting Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983)); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 772, 739 (1991) (“[W]e have no
power to tell state courts how they must write their opinions.”).
240 AM. J. CRIM. L. Vol 29: 223
Second, basing federal review on the reasoning of a state-court
opinion would distort the original purposes of habeas corpus.  Under this
view, habeas relief might be granted,83 not because the petitioner’s
confinement violated the constitution, but because the state courts were
inarticulate in their opinions.84  This would continue to be the case even if
the state-court judges actually had carefully considered the correct
Supreme Court precedent and properly applied it to arrive at the right
result, but just failed to record that process on paper.  Granting a habeas
petitioner a new trial in this situation would unnecessarily punish the state
courts and, at the same time, would give the petitioner a windfall new
trial to which he has no basis for entitlement.
This is not to say that no policy concerns are worthy of
consideration.  Indeed, forcing judges to explain their reasoning on paper
for public scrutiny would likely improve the quality of the adjudication
process.  Moreover, at least one federal circuit judge has expressed the
fear that state courts might attempt to circumvent habeas review by
intentionally refusing to articulate their reasoning.85  While these may or
may not be cause for serious concern, they cannot carry the day.  To the
extent that they are valid, Congress surely weighed them and considered
them incidental to other, overriding purposes.  To the extent that they are
merely theoretical possibilities, they must, in this dual system of
government, be resolved in favor of proper state-court judging.  In other
words, the functioning of our judicial system depends upon the
assumption that state-court judges, like all other judges, uphold their
duties to interpret, unflinchingly and honorably, the law presented to
them.  The idea that a judge would give an issue short shrift, with the
obvious result of condemning a man to an unconstitutional criminal
punishment, is unthinkable; to make that idea the default assumption is to
                                                                                                           
83  A habeas courts cannot remand but can only grant a new trial as the sole remedy.  See
Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335 (“A federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding cannot remand the case to
the state appellate court for a clarification of that court’s opinion; all it can do is order a new
trial!.!.!.!.”); Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000) (“It would be error for a
federal court to ‘remand’ an action to the state appellate courts for the issuance of fuller findings to
facilitate review under AEDPA or for a federal court to order any state court to issue fuller
findings.”).
84  See Hennon, 109 F.3d at 335 (explaining that a review of state court reasoning could mean
granting the writ even “though the defendant may have been the victim not of any constitutional error
but merely of a failure of judicial articulateness”).
85  See Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 184 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Motz, J., dissenting)
(“After all, the North Carolina courts enunciated no reason for their decision and from what can be
gleaned from the record this most likely was because they were unfaithful to well-established
Supreme Court precedent.  State courts should not be allowed to insulate their decisions by failing to
express their reasoning.”), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 74 (2001); see also Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d
976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing the argument but rejecting it).  But see Washington v.
Schriver, 255 F.3d 45, 62-63 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (Washington II) (suggesting
that state courts will actually prefer to expose difficult decisions to federal review).
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negate the idea that judges are honest interpreters of our governing
precepts.
A more persuasive policy suggestion is the one ingeniously
advanced by Judge Calabresi in his Washington II concurrence.  He
asserted that state judges, as members of the justice system, are naturally
concerned with the unconstitutional confinement of prisoners.
Constitutional law may present difficult questions that state courts,
knowing AEDPA deference essentially ensures that their reasonable
interpretation will be upheld even if incorrect, will want to resolve
correctly.86  This places a “heavy, and sometimes unwanted and
unmanageable burden” on the state courts.87  Conditioning AEDPA
deference on the appearance of a federal rationale permits the state
courts to choose take or avoid this burden.88  If the state court is
confident of its decision, it can cite federal law and be afforded
deference.89  If the state court is unsure of its decision, it can summarily
deny the claim and know that the claim will be reviewed de novo by the
federal courts.90  In this way, claims Judge Calabresi, the considerations
of federalism are in the state courts’ hands.91
A panel of the Second Circuit roundly criticized Judge
Calabresi’s suggestion as leading to potentially “deleterious substantive
consequences.”92  That panel predicted that his suggestion would
encourage state prisoners to press federal claims in a cursory manner
with the hope that the state court will not address them, and federal
                                                                                                           
86  See Washington II , 255 F.3d at 63 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Specifically, if AEDPA
deference were deemed automatically and universally to apply, then that law would require
extremely busy State court judges to figure out what can be very complicated questions of federal
law at the pain of having a defendant incorrectly stay in prison should the State court decision of
these complex questions turn out to be mistaken (but not unreasonably so).”).
87  Id. at 62 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
88  See id. at 63 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“In contrast, a reading of the AEDPA under
which AEDPA deference does not apply where a State court has rejected a petitioner’s claim without
expressly mentioning its federal aspects allows State courts to avoid this burden.  It enables State
courts to choose whether or not they wish to take on the burden and be deferred to.”) (emphasis in
original).
89  See id. (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Under this interpretation, State courts that wish fully
to evaluate federal claims need only indicate that they have done so, and their decisions will be
deferred to.”).
90  See id. (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Conversely, State courts that believe that their energy
and resources are better employed elsewhere can remain silent without having the AEDPA impose
on them the burden (and all the consequences) of being treated as if they have given the in depth
consideration that AEDPA deference implicates.  And they can make this docket controlling choice
on a case by case basis.”).
91  See id.  (Calabresi, J., concurring) (“Nor does this rule at all infringe on the freedom of
State courts [because] they can command deference concerning the issues they wish to decide, and
pass on for de novo review the issues they prefer to avoid, or to treat less fully.”).
92  Sellan v. Kuhlman, 261 F.3d 303, 313 (2d Cir. 2001).
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review would thus be de novo.93  The effect, claimed the panel, would
be at odds with the “spirit of AEDPA which respects the state court’s
adjudication of all claims.”94
The Sellan panel’s prediction that prisoners would not press
claims in state court is, in my opinion, an extremely unlikely one.  The
misguided prisoner who only mildly asserts a constitutional claim in state
courts risks foregoing a full round of state review of his claim,95 and
then risks his habeas petition being dismissed by the federal habeas court
for failure to present the claim to the state courts.96  The risks, it seems
clear to me, would dissuade most prisoners from attempting what the
Sellan court predicts.
Although I disagree with the Sellan panel’s specific criticism, I
submit that Judge Calabresi’s proposal cannot be endorsed for one
simple reason.  It is his alone and not Congress’s.  For the reasons stated
above, nothing in the text or legislative history indicates that Judge
Calabresi’s suggestion is appropriate.  Without such support, one
creative idea cannot override the much more defensible interpretation
that even a state-court decision silent on reasoning is an adjudication
entitled to AEDPA deference.
IV. Conclusion
I have argued that AEDPA requires federal court deference to a
state-court decision which is clearly on the merits of a federal question,
even if unaccompanied by an articulated rationale.  A moment is
necessary to explain the limited contours of my argument.  I speak only
concerning those cases in which a state court clearly resolves a specific
claim or group of claims on the merits.  I make no comment on the
appropriate standard of review when a state court wholly fails to resolve
                                                                                                           
93  See id. at 313-14 (“[The rule] could encourage state prisoners to press their federal claims
in state court in an essentially cursory manner—just enough to exhaust state remedies and to avoid
default or waiver, but not too strongly—with the hope that the state court will not ‘refer to’ or
engage in any lengthy discussion of their federal claims, thus entitling the prisoner to de novo
consideration of these claims on federal habeas review.”).
94  Id. at 314 (emphasis in original).
95 See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437 (2000) (“For state courts to have their rightful
opportunity to adjudicate federal rights, the prisoner must be diligent in developing the record and
presenting, if possible, all claims of constitutional error.  If the prisoner fails to do so, himself or
herself contributing to the absence of a full and fair adjudication in state court, §!2254(e)(2)
prohibits an evidentiary hearing to develop the relevant claims in federal court, unless the statute’s
other stringent requirements are met.”); see also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 765 (1991)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[E]ncouraging a defendant to assert his federal rights in the appropriate
state forum makes it possible for transgressions to be arrested sooner and before they influence an
erroneous deprivation of liberty.”).
96  See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring unexhausted claims to be dismissed
without prejudice for reconsideration by the state court).
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a federal question that has been fairly presented,97 or when a state court’s
procedurally-based decision is circumvented98 by, for example, a
showing of cause and prejudice.99  I also do not address cases that
purport dispose wholesale a number of presented claims by proclaiming
them “either unpreserved for appellate review or without merit.”  In that
vein, nothing here should be taken to extend to judicially-created
presumptions or assumptions that a particular state-court decision is on
the merits, rather than procedurally resolved or mistakenly unaddressed.
I only examine federal habeas review of state-court determinations of
federal law that are clearly on the merits.  That examination conclusively
establishes that such determinations are “adjudications” under AEDPA.
                                                                                                           
97  See, e.g., DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that pre-AEDPA de
novo review applies to claims fairly presented but not adjudicated); Hameen v. Delaware., 212 F.3d
226, 248 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that pre-AEDPA de novo review applies to claims fairly presented
but not adjudicated), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1365 (2001); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274
(5th Cir. 1999) (holding that pre-AEDPA de novo review applies to claims fairly presented but not
adjudicated).
98  Compare Lockhart v. Terhune, 250 F.3d 1223, 1230 (9th Cir. 2001) (reviewing a state
court decision made pursuant to state law by asking whether the state law was contrary to clearly
established federal law), with Doan v. Brigiano, 237 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2001) (attempting to apply §
2254(d)), and Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 916-17 (7th Cir. 2000) (refusing to employ the
AEDPA standard of review).
99  Such a case, in my opinion, means that there has been no “adjudication” of the federal
claim, and therefore, § 2254(d) cannot apply.
